Certain secular thinkers, notably Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and the late Christopher Hitchens, collectively known as "New Atheists," argue that we should utilize rational thought and scientific understanding to navigate significant moral dilemmas. These individuals typically dismiss the existence of objective moral truths or the idea that actions can be inherently wrong, as well as rejecting absolute moral guidelines. They advocate for the exclusion of spiritual or religious considerations in moral reasoning.

This paper aims to explore facets of this stance, which is, in many respects, not novel among the New Atheists. Additionally, I will reflect on how this viewpoint influences our discussions regarding animal ethics. In recent years, I have observed a rise in animal advocates asserting that the basis for animal rights can be firmly established solely on rationality and scientific reasoning while denying the existence of independent moral truths.

It is crucial to emphasize that rejecting scientific rationality as a means to understand morality does not lead us to embrace "supernatural" beliefs or to adopt a form of moral relativism or subjectivism. One can hold beliefs in moral realism or accept the principle of nonviolence as a moral truth without adhering to the belief in a creator deity or the survival of consciousness after death. A significant issue arises when this debate is framed as a choice between rejecting relativism and subjectivism or gravitating towards supernatural explanations versus scientific rationality, which is a misleading dichotomy.

A Choice Between Utilitarianism and Extremism:

Literary critic Terry Eagleton critiques Dawkins’ work, The God Delusion, stating that he often conflates religion with fundamentalism. Dawkins also tends to associate rule-based moral frameworks with religious influence, equating them with fundamentalist doctrines.

For instance, while briefly acknowledging Kant, Dawkins asserts that “deontology does not equate to moral absolutism,” indicating that for most discussions regarding religion, it is unnecessary to differentiate between the two. He contends that although not all absolutism stems from religious belief, defending absolutist morals without a religious context is challenging.

I agree that moral realism is essential for establishing absolute moral standards, which I believe to be true, such as the absolute wrongness of exploiting vulnerable individuals, committing sexual assault, or engaging in animal exploitation. However, the foundation for these standards need not stem from religious beliefs.

Dawkins contrasts deontologists with consequentialists, asserting that the morality of actions should be evaluated based on their outcomes. This indicates that he is attempting to portray consequentialist theories, like utilitarianism, as less tied to the absolutism characteristic of religious fundamentalism compared to rights-based theories. This dynamic is familiar, as animal welfare proponents often categorize animal rights advocates as "fundamentalists."

In any case, viewing this discussion as a rivalry between New Atheists and religious extremists—who justify acts such as the murder of abortion providers, suicide bombings, and other forms of violence in the name of their gods—allows the New Atheists to emerge victorious without the necessary critical analysis this issue deserves.

Yet, the discourse between the New Atheists and other perspectives involves more than mere preferences between utilitarians and extremists. The more compelling aspect of this debate centers on the assertion that any discussion of objective moral truths or absolute moral standards, separate from scientific rationality, is problematic and must be rejected to avoid being labeled an "enemy of reason." This framing positions the New Atheists against anyone who argues for the necessity of some objective, stance-independent moral truths or absolute moral standards that extend beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. While religious extremists certainly belong to this latter category, even in their absence, the broader controversy would persist.

I intend to concentrate on those who support some variant of moral realism, which suggests that moral statements make claims that can be deemed true or false, with at least some of these claims being accurate. For example, a moral realist would equate the assertion "slavery is wrong" with the statement "the chair is brown," as both express a moral fact and are true if the claims hold.

Moral realism differs from the notion that moral truths are constructed based on human values; it posits that moral truths exist independently of any perspective, including ideal perspectives. This group also encompasses individuals aligned with non-Western, often non-theistic spiritual traditions advocating nonviolence, as well as those adhering to traditional theistic religions that reject violent interpretations in favor of universal love and nonviolence.

An example of the kind of debate I have in mind—though I won't delve into it extensively here—is the exchange between Christopher Hitchens and Chris Hedges, or between Sam Harris and Hedges. Hedges, a progressive Christian, denounces the religious fundamentalism targeted by New Atheists but contends that scientific rationality is not the solution, as both groups exhibit similar intolerance: “Those who do not see as they see, speak as they speak, and act as they act are worthy only of conversion or eradication.”

The discourse between Hedges and the New Atheists is informed by Hedges' extensive experiences as a foreign correspondent and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who has reported on conflicts across various regions, observing numerous atrocities. Consequently, he focuses on the New Atheists’ support for conflicts like the Iraq War, as well as Harris' assertion that we are “at war with Islam.”

While I generally align with Hedges' critique of the New Atheists, I wish to examine the matter from a broader perspective. In the following section, I will argue that the premise of rational action itself is a normative assertion that, akin to mathematical axioms, cannot be “proven” and must be accepted as true.

Even if we accept rationality as a desirable norm or some formal requisite, we cannot address moral questions without invoking moral beliefs that lie beyond the purview of scientific or rational proof and are contingent upon something independent of transient desires, perspectives, or emotions. I will also explore the idea that science is a social endeavor that is inherently intertwined with political and moral implications.

Rationality and Moral Truth

Rationality pertains to the appropriateness of means relative to ends. When we label someone as irrational, we typically mean they are selecting means unsuitable for their intended outcome.

Rationality also involves the coherence of beliefs. If I believe “if X then Y” and also accept “X,” then I ought to believe “Y” as well.

However, the assertion that "we ought to be rational" necessitates normative concepts and the very unprovable beliefs that some dismiss pejoratively.

Initially, consider the statement "we ought to be rational" without considering what rationality entails regarding actions or beliefs.

Why should we be rational? What compels us to believe “Y” if we already accept “If X then Y” and “X”?

How can we "prove" these "ought" assertions?

The succinct answer is that we cannot. These assertions, akin to mathematical axioms, must be accepted as true. Thus, the claim "we ought to be rational" represents a normative stance no more substantiated than the claim "we ought to treat each other with kindness."

A counterargument might suggest that, while we cannot demonstrate the truth of the assertion "we ought to be rational," this claim must be valid since, without it, we could neither make assertions nor engage in arguments. However, this is not entirely accurate. Even without acknowledging the objective truth of rationality, we could still formulate claims and engage in arguments that may be valid or invalid. We would simply be unable to argue that a person who disagreed with the conclusion of a sound argument is being irrational. Thus, this rebuttal still leaves an "ought" that requires explanation at the most fundamental level.

Moreover, even if we disregard the preceding concerns and accept that we ought to select means that effectively promote our ends or maintain beliefs consistent with our other beliefs, rationality does not dictate which ends we should pursue or what beliefs we should hold.

The conclusion is clear: rationality offers no guidance whatsoever.

Rationality is merely a formal necessity and does not determine the ends we ought to prioritize or the beliefs we ought to maintain. For instance, pursuing actions leading to the extinction of life is irrational if one does not consider extinction a desirable outcome. However, for those who view extinction as beneficial—believing humanity is a blight on Earth or disregarding future generations—environmentally harmful behavior could seem entirely rational. Rationality cannot resolve the dilemma of whether humanity is a blight in need of eradication or if we have a duty to preserve the planet for future generations.

Similarly, if I assert that "all humans possess equal inherent value" and acknowledge that members of group X are indeed human, rationality dictates that I must conclude they possess equal inherent value to other humans.

Nevertheless, despite philosopher Immanuel Kant's assertion that reason mandates the recognition of equal inherent value among humans, I may reject egalitarianism if I believe that individuals who excel in arts or music possess greater inherent value due to their unique contributions to our lives. I might argue that these "exceptional" individuals are not acting immorally when treating others merely as means to an end. While Kant presents compelling arguments for equality—ones I contend should extend to nonhumans—there is no way to “prove” Kant's correctness using rationality alone. Kant's theory (with or without my modifications) necessitates certain moral beliefs about inclusion in the moral community, and no "objective" rationality can compel adherence to those views.

The selection of values or moral beliefs involves factors that transcend rationality, and there is no means of evading this reality. New Atheists Hitchens and Harris, alongside Chris Hedges, are all rational individuals in that they believe their convictions ought to be coherent. Yet, they hold markedly different moral beliefs.

Notably, some prominent New Atheists argue—like Ayn Rand—that rational, atheistic reasoning aligns with right-wing ideologies. As mentioned previously, Hitchens was a staunch supporter of the Iraq war and espoused several right-leaning views, while Sam Harris asserts that we are “at war with Islam,” claiming, “The connection between belief and behavior significantly raises the stakes. Certain propositions are so perilous that it may even be ethical to kill individuals for holding them.” Indeed, Harris claims to demonstrate that we can "scientifically" prove that Islam is a morally deficient religion.

Whether one agrees with these assertions (I certainly do not), it is misguided to deny that they reflect specific moral beliefs that cannot be validated as true in any "objective" or uncontroversial manner. Chris Hedges contests these views, not due to irrationality, but because he subscribes to a different set of moral principles. The contention between the New Atheists, who hold various normative beliefs, and individuals like Hedges cannot be settled through rational appeals; it ultimately comes down to aligning with one’s vision of morality.

Noam Chomsky characterizes Harris and Hitchens as “religious fanatics” who adhere to a “religion of the state,” arguing that they justify defending state violence and atrocities in the name of human progress and other noble outcomes.

This belief in a progressively improving world is echoed by Dawkins, who champions a concept he calls the "moral Zeitgeist," which he describes as a “widespread liberal consensus of ethical principles” evolving independently of religion. Setting aside the fact that many values he mentions have been primarily driven by peaceful interpretations of religious and spiritual beliefs, some of his arguments claiming that society is improving are astounding. For instance, he remarks that Hitler “would not have seemed out of place during the era of Caligula or Genghis Khan.” He acknowledges civilian casualties in Iraq but claims they are “orders of magnitude lower than comparable numbers from World War II.” Disregarding the moral implications of judging wars based merely on casualty counts (should we invade countries without armies to lower casualties?), the notion of a "moral Zeitgeist" advancing is premised on fewer deaths occurring in a fabricated "preventative" war against a non-threatening opponent (Saddam Hussein) compared to the war against Hitler, who was himself a significant improvement over Caligula.

Frankly, I find Dawkins' views here to be remarkably reactionary.

Interestingly, Sam Harris professes to be a moral realist. However, just as my claim to be President of the United States does not confer that title upon me, Harris' assertion of being a moral realist does not make it true. Moral realism, as articulated by Russ Schafer-Landau in his book Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford 2003), posits that “there are moral truths that exist independently of any particular perspective, such that the moral standards that determine the moral facts are not made true by their acceptance within any given actual or hypothetical viewpoint.” It appears to me that Harris does not fit this definition of realism.

Although Harris is ambiguous, it seems he implies that, due to our nature as beings, we inevitably value well-being—perceived as objectively valuable—and view ourselves as morally obligated to maximize well-being. This interpretation positions Harris as a constructivist, suggesting that well-being is rendered a "true" moral value through our perspectives.

Alternatively, Harris may contend that moral claims are descriptive assertions about well-being, and that science can verify the truth of those claims. Essentially, as we assert that we cannot engage in scientific inquiry without valuing certain types of evidence and coherence, we cannot participate in moral actions without valuing well-being as a defining characteristic of moral engagement. Thus, when stating, “John ought to perform action A,” we mean, “If John executes A, well-being is likely to result.” Science can inform us of the extent to which A will lead to well-being. Yet, this involves a semantic deflation (Harris posits that moral statements equate to factual assertions regarding well-being) and enables Harris to sidestep the is/ought dilemma. There is no reference to any ultimate normative standard as objectively true, thus failing to meet the criteria of moral realism.

Should Harris be interpreted as asserting that well-being holds value in a stance-independent manner and that we are obligated to enhance it, he would simply be another consequentialist thinker, contributing nothing new to ethical theory beyond his claim to "scientifically" validate his ethnocentric and xenophobic statements, such as the assertion that Islam is a morally deficient religion.

Deriving "Ought" from Scientific "Is" Claims

Some New Atheists assert that objective or stance-independent moral truths, as well as spiritual or religious beliefs, cannot inform us about what "is." Only science can provide authentic facts. Science is deemed to deliver objective Truth, while everything else falls short of that standard.

This perspective overlooks the fact that the metatheories establishing what constitutes “science” are, like mathematical axioms or the premise that rationality is a formal requirement, assertions that must be accepted as true without proof. While proponents of New Atheism may acknowledge this as an abstract proposition, they fail to grasp its implications for their argument.

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, arguably the most influential 20th-century work on the philosophy of science, popularized the term "paradigm" to describe scientific achievements that, for a period, dictate what is observed, the questions posed, the structure of inquiries, and the interpretation of investigative outcomes. Kuhn convincingly argued that paradigms cannot be proven true or false and that viewing science as "Truth" is naive. Different paradigms reflect distinct worldviews and perspectives.

Paul Feyerabend, in works like Against Method, expanded on this notion, challenging the rationalist belief in identifiable scientific methods that define “good” science. He posited that science often involves more myth than scientists acknowledge, with successful scientists frequently drawing on non-scientific elements, including inspiration from mythical or religious origins. Feyerabend argued that the delineation between science and religion, myth, or magic is itself a myth.

Even if one does not accept the assertions of Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others regarding the assumptions underpinning science that cannot be proven, or the absence of a clear divide between science and religion, it is implausible to believe that science, as practiced, exists independently of political and social institutions. As Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin noted in their groundbreaking work The Dialectical Biologist, science occurs within a social framework and reflects an inherently political perspective.

To illustrate this point, consider Richard Dawkins’ 1976 publication, The Selfish Gene. Is Dawkins asserting a “scientific” claim about genes as “facts,” or is he instead examining human selfishness and altruism, utilizing these behaviors to propose a "scientific" description of the evolutionary process, which he then applies to elucidate human behaviors? I align with esteemed philosopher Mary Midgley and others in believing that Dawkins’ premise is a hypothesis rooted more in reductive individualism than in Darwin’s views, which emphasized interaction and collaboration. The "selfish gene" is not an objective fact; its popularity coincided with the rise of Reagan/Thatcher ideologies that glorified selfishness, independence, and individualism. If Ayn Rand had lived longer, she might have envisioned a sequel to her poorly written Atlas Shrugged, with Richard Dawkins as the heroic figure.

Sam Harris explicitly claims that we are “at war with Islam.” Does this “fact” represent an objectively true assertion, or does it merely reflect Harris' alignment with specific political beliefs that shape his interpretation of global events and the “facts” he acknowledges? Harris posits that Taliban morality is inferior “from the perspective of science.”

Science purports that we ought to accept what the evidence suggests. This assertion itself is normative. But let's presume that we ought to adhere to evidence. What constitutes evidence? The answer is that certain evidence, compatible with the scientific paradigm's assumptions, is acknowledged, while all other evidence is disregarded. Various forms of empiricism exist (the theory that knowledge is derived from sensory experience rather than being innate). It is incorrect to assert that moral realism or spiritual traditions lack concern for evidence or that no evidence supports them. There is a quest for evidence, but it is simply not deemed "scientific" knowledge because science dismisses that type of evidence from the outset. Numerous aspects can be measured; however, science only quantifies certain elements and dictates how measurement occurs, leaving everything else unaccounted for.

William James argued that we might be justified in holding spiritual or religious beliefs, even in the absence of supporting evidence.

The New Atheists provide a limited and impoverished choice: a false dichotomy between religious fundamentalism and what amounts to scientism, or “an exaggerated faith in the effectiveness of natural science methods applied to all fields of inquiry (including philosophy, social sciences, and the humanities).” However, even if we assume that science can deliver uncontroversial "is" statements, we cannot derive "ought" assertions from these "is" statements. As Chris Hedges articulates, “The belief that rational and quantifiable disciplines such as science can perfect human society is as absurd as believing in magic, angels, and divine intervention.”

The conviction that science yields "true" answers to significant moral inquiries has consistently produced profoundly troubling outcomes. Historically, science has asserted that women would suffer physical damage from excessive education; indeed, it has often been used to justify various forms of discrimination based on gender. Science has also propagated the notion that people of color were physically and cognitively inferior to white individuals as a "fact" justifying slavery. Countless instances demonstrate how science has been misappropriated to endorse violence and discrimination.

One might counter that science has also supported ethical outcomes. For instance, scientists eventually abandoned “scientific” claims regarding women's physical inferiority. However, that illustrates the core point: it is not science that dictates morality; rather, morality (and immorality) informs scientific inquiry. To employ a loose analogy from quantum theory: our moral consciousness shapes the reality we perceive.

Atheism and Animal Rights

Many animal advocates identify as atheists, yet they err if they believe that an "objective" rationality or a fusion of rationality and scientific facts—while dismissing moral premises—can yield the conclusion that we ought to cease exploiting animals.

The abolitionist philosophy I advocate relies on rational argumentation but ultimately stands on a foundation of moral realism. For instance, when I assert, “inflicting suffering on a sentient being without adequate justification is wrong,” I intend for this principle to reflect a moral fact. From this principle, combined with the logical premise that moral notions lose meaning if an adequate justification includes the pleasure, amusement, or convenience of those imposing the suffering, I argue that we cannot justify most forms of animal usage, regardless of their perceived "humaneness." (I have additional arguments against any animal use deemed acceptable under the "necessity" argument.)

Thus, this theory (or that portion of it) rests on logic and rationality, alongside certain non-moral facts regarding animal sentience. However, one cannot arrive at any normative conclusion without accepting the moral fact that inflicting suffering on another sentient being without adequate justification is wrong. If you ask me to “prove” the validity of that moral fact using a framework dictated by science or in a manner that compels acceptance from all rational individuals, I cannot. However, this does not imply that “inflicting suffering on animals without justification is wrong” is not a moral fact; it simply indicates that its truth does not hinge on observational evidence.

My views are grounded in moral intuitions derived from experience, yet they cannot be validated using the evidence that aligns with the prevailing scientific paradigm. Nevertheless, I maintain that the truth of the moral intuition, “inflicting suffering on animals without adequate justification is wrong,” is self-evident, even if its veracity does not rely on observation.

Another argument I present is that if animals are to possess any moral significance, we must grant them the right to not be treated as property. I further argue that acknowledging this fundamental right necessitates the abolition of all institutionalized animal use, regardless of its perceived "humaneness." Similar to my earlier argument, this stance relies on a moral intuition: that animals hold moral value, even in the face of cognitive discrepancies between humans and nonhumans. If you share that intuition—if you accept the moral fact that animals are morally relevant—then rationality requires recognizing that animals possess a pre-legal, inherent right to not be treated as property. However, rationality does not mandate that you see animals merely as objects.

Furthermore, Peter Singer and other advocates of a welfare-oriented position acknowledge that animals have morally significant interests but assert, contrary to my perspective, that we can morally maintain the institution of animal property, as animals lack reflective self-awareness like humans and do not possess an interest in continued life. Therefore, we may utilize and kill animals for human purposes, provided we treat them in a manner that respects their interests, particularly the interest in avoiding suffering.

This raises another significant issue that cannot be resolved solely through appeals to rationality or scientific facts. While Singer and I agree that sentience is sufficient for animals to attain moral significance, we diverge in our beliefs regarding the necessity of an interest in continued life, which Singer considers essential for at least minimal moral protection against being used as resources. I contend that sentience suffices for an interest in continued existence, and this interest should be safeguarded not merely as a prima facie matter but as a matter of moral right, leading to the conclusion that we cannot justify any form of animal exploitation.

Setting aside the fact that I recognize moral rights while Singer does not (an additional issue unresolvable through appeals to scientific rationality), my disagreement with Singer appears, at least in part, to concern a factual matter that could be resolved through some form of "scientific" discovery regarding animal self-awareness. In other words, he asserts that most animals lack an interest in continued existence due to their absence of self-awareness; I refute this claim. While there is a factual component regarding animal consciousness at play, a more significant non-factual aspect exists that science cannot resolve concerning what constitutes self-awareness for moral considerations. Singer argues that the relevant self-awareness is reflective, while I maintain that it is irrelevant since the only self-awareness that matters for possessing an interest in continued existence is that which stems from perceptual awareness associated with mere sentience.

Consequently, Singer and I may concur on the factual aspects of animal consciousness yet arrive at differing conclusions due to our divergent definitions of self-awareness as it pertains to the interest in continued existence. Ultimately, rationality and science cannot resolve these kinds of disagreements.

Rationality and a Revolution of the Heart

I often assert that the cessation of animal exploitation demands “a revolution of the heart.” By this, I mean we must reject all ideologies of domination and power—be they religious or secular—that allow us to dehumanize other sentient beings, be they human or nonhuman, transforming them into the "other" and permitting us to overlook their moral significance and treat them as mere objects. We must adopt nonviolence as a fundamental normative principle—a principle that we recognize as embodying a moral truth—and from which all our ethical positions derive. Philosopher Gary Steiner’s concept of kinship aligns directly with these ideas.

I believe that numerous spiritual and religious traditions, when properly interpreted, prioritize nonviolence as a primary value. I reject any traditions that do not uphold this principle. However, I do not dismiss them due to perceived "irrationality"; ideologies of power and domination can be rational if they align with one's moral compass. I oppose ideologies of power and domination—whether religious or secular—because I consider them morally misguided.

A revolution of the heart necessitates that we redefine ourselves in alignment with the highest aspirations shared by all traditions that emphasize nonviolence, while also discarding any frameworks that foster violence, discrimination, prejudice, and hatred.

The appeal of the New Atheists lies in the fact that many, including those who once adhered to traditional religions, are weary of the violence—hatred, prejudice, discrimination, wars, materialism, etc.—that certain institutionalized religions have perpetuated. Rejecting this hatred and violence is commendable. Numerous animal advocates correctly point out that interpretations of traditions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have been utilized to justify speciesism and animal exploitation. This has led many advocates to express hostility towards spiritual beliefs or the notion of objective moral truths. However, perhaps we should consider that the genuine issue is not with spiritual or religious beliefs per se, but rather with the violence that some interpretations—whether rightly or wrongly—have incited.

To the extent that any form of violence is perceived as endorsed by “god” or religion, simply eliminating the deity or faith does not automatically result in peace, love, and justice. Secular institutions are also capable of promoting violence.

Christopher Hitchens, a New Atheist, stated, “I firmly believe that the primary source of hatred in the world is religion, and organized religion.” I would argue differently. Hatred is the core issue; neither religious nor secular institutions create hatred. They merely provide a channel for its expression.

I accept that the notion of a revolution of the heart is rooted in a moral concept that cannot be "proven" true in the manner that science defines truth, nor can it meet the evidentiary standards accepted by science. It necessitates belief in the moral truth of nonviolence, which scientific rationality cannot deliver, nor can it guide us towards any moral truth.